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Part Ⅰ—Rethinking Specific Offenses1

Chapter One: The Topology of Theft3

1.1. Introduction3

1.1.1. Larceny and Embezzlement4

1.1.2. Obtaining Property by False Pretenses10

1.2. Points of Stress in the Topology of Theft13

1.2.1. Receiving the Chattel with a Fraudulent Purpose15

1.2.2. The Problem of Finders18

1.2.3. The Problem of Mistaken Delivery20

1.2.4. The Problem of Delivery from a Third Party22

1.2.5. A Guide to Analyzing Theft Offenses26

A. Custody Acquired at T128

B. Possession Acquired at T128

C. Title Acquired at T129

1.3. The Interests Protected by Theft Offenses30

1.3.1. An Earlier Understanding31

1.3.2. Larceny as a Crime Against Possession35

1.3.3. Protecting Objects and Protecting Economic Interests39

1.3.4. The Interests Protected in Punishing Fraud49

Chapter Two: Gommon-Law Larceny and Its Metamorphosis59

2.1. Enigmas of the Common Law59

2.1.1. Possessorial Immunity61

2.1.2. Enigmas of the Common Law: The Carrier's Case66

2.1.3. The Problem of Staged Larceny70

2.2. A Theory for Resolving the Enigmas of the Common Law76

2.2.1. Possessorial Immunity81

2.2.2. Carrier's Case83

2.2.3. Staged Larceny86

2.2.4. The Rationale of Manifest Criminality88

2.3. The Metamorphosis of Larceny90

2.3.1. The King v. Pear90

2.3.2. Reinterpreting the Tradition94

2.3.3. The Intellectual Background100

2.4. Judicial Expansion of the Common Law103

2.4.1. Liability of Finders104

2.4.2. The Problem of Mistaken Delivery107

2.4.3. Legislative Consolidation110

Chapter Three: Two Pattems of Criminality115

3.1. Abstracting from the History of Larceny115

3.1.1. The Pattem of Manifest Criminality115

3.1.2. The Pattern of Subjective Criminality118

3.1.3. Maxims Common to Both Patterns of Liability119

3.2. Related Theft Offenses122

3.2.1. Embezzlement122

3.2.2. False Pretenses124

3.2.3. Burglary124

3.2.4. New Offenses Akin to Burglary-Without-Breaking128

3.3. Attempts131

3.3.1. Two Doctrinal Issues in Attempts135

3.3.2. Objectivist Approaches and the Theory of Attempts139

A. Stages of Commission140

B. The Criterion of Danger141

C. Apprehension and Unequivocal Conduct141

3.3.3. Manifest Criminality and Impossible Attempts146

A. The Shooting Cases149

B. The Poisoning Cases152

C. The Empty Receptacle Cases154

D. Receiving Stolen Property154

3.3.4. A General Theory of Attempting157

3.3.5. The Ascendancy of Subjective Criminality166

3.3.6. The Principles Behind the Subjectivist Theory of Attempts170

3.3.7. The Prospects of a Subjective Theory of Attempts174

3.3.8. The Problem of Abandonment184

3.4. Possession Offenses197

3.4.1. Possession Offenses as a Form of Discretionary Social Control202

3.5. The Overt Act in Treason205

3.5.1. Compassing Death and Overt Acts207

3.5.2. Overt Acts and Treason Under the Constitution213

3.6. An Excursus on Conspiracy218

3.6.1. Inconsistent Criteria of Inchoate Liability220

3.6.2. The Requirement of an Overt Act223

3.7. Stop-and-Frisk and Flirtations with Manifest Criminality225

3.8. The Two Patterns of.Criminality Revisited232

Chapter Four: Homicide: Three Lines of Liability235

4.1. Toward a Third Pattern of Liability235

4.2. Intentional Killings242

4.2.1. Provocation242

4.2.2. Diminished Capacity250

4.2.3. Premeditation and Deliberation253

4.2.4. Intention in Homicide256

4.3. Homicide by Excessive Risk-Taking259

4.3.1. Liability for Manslaughter262

4.3.2. Liability for Murder264

4.4. Formal Criteria of Liability274

4.4.1. The Historical Background276

4.4.2. The Misdemeanor-Manslaughter Rule285

4.4.3. Tort Theory Points the Way287

4.4.4. Felony-Murder in the Second Degree290

4.4.5. Conflicting Rationalia for Curtailing the Second-Degree Felony-Murder Rule297

4.4.6. First-Degree Murder: The Means Tests303

4.4.7. First-Degree Murder: Felony-Murder307

4.4.8. The Institutional Context of Formal Liability319

4.5. Comparative Notes321

4.5.1. Analogues to Manslaughter322

4.5.2. The Standard Form of Criminal Homicide325

4.5.3. Aggravated Homicide326

A. The Motive of the Slaying326

B. The Manner of Killing328

C. Felony-Murder330

4.5.4. Special Features of Continental Legislation331

A. Killing on Request332

B. Infanticide334

4.6. Capital Homicide336

Chapter Five: The Jurisprudence of Homicide341

5.1. The Uniqueness of Homicide341

5.1.1. Blaming and Tainting343

5.1.2. Omissions and Negligence349

5.1.3. Interaction with the Victim and Culpability by Degrees350

5.1.4. The Outer and Inner Circles of Liability355

5.2. The Outer Circle of Liability358

5.2.1. The Jurisprudence of Acting358

5.2.2. The Jurisprudence of Causing Death360

A. The Degree of Causal Contribution362

B. The Victim Endangers His or Her Own Life365

C. An Intentional Intervening Act by a Third Person366

5.2.3. The Jurisprudence of Life and Death372

5.3. From Desecration to a Pattern of Harmful Consequences379

5.3.1. Desecration in a Secular Society380

5.3.2. A Pattern of Harmful Consequences385

5.3.3. The Three Patterns of Liability388

Part Ⅱ--Rethinking the General Part391

Chapter Six: The Quest for the General Part393

6.1. The Need for Synthesis393

6.2. Some Preliminary Distinctions395

6.2.1. Descriptive.and Normative Uses of the Same Terms396

6.2.2. Conceptual and Empirical Propositions401

6.2.3. Analyzing Statutes and Explicating the Structure of the Criminal Law406

6.3. Punishment and Its Rationale408

6.3.1. On What Punishment Is409

6.3.2. The Rationale of Punishment414

6.4. The Concept of Acting420

6.4.1. Acts and Omissions421

6.4.2. Acts Contrasted with Conditions426

6.4.3. The Teleological Theory of Action433

6.5. The Concept of Intention439

6.5.1. Intending and Desiring440

6.5.2. Intention and Recklessness442

6.5.3. Intending and Omissions449

6.5.4. Intention in Ordinary Language449

6.5.5. Intention and Motives452

6.5.6. A Glossary of Intents452

6.6. The Concepts of Wrongdoing and Attribution454

6.6.1. Wrongdoing and Norms456

6.6.2. Punishment and Wrongdoing459

A. The Components of Desert461

B. Defiance as Wrongdoing463

6.6.3. On the Indispensability of Wrongdoing466

6.6.4. On the Externality of Wrongdoing469

6.6.5. Wrongdoing and Harm472

A. Arguments for the Three German Theories476

B. The Evidentiary Value of Harm481

C. Harm and Remorse482

6.6.6. Wrongdoing, Mistakes and Accidents483

6.7. Tensions in the Theory of Attribution491

6.7.1. The Descriptive Theory of Attribution492

6.7.2. The Normative Theory of Attribution495

6.7.3. Responsibility and Attribution496

6.7.4. Guilt Without Attribution497

6.8. Objectivity and Subjectivity in Criminal Theory504

6.8.1. Utility and Objective Standards506

6.8.2. Justice and Attribution511

Chapter Seven: The Structure of Wrongdoing515

7.1. Introduction515

7.2. The Problem of the Burden of Persuasion516

7.2.1. The Private Law Style519

7.2.2. The Private Law Style in Criminal Litigation524

7.3. The Revolt Against the Private Law Style532

7.3.1. The Emergence of a Normative Theory of Guilt532

7.3.2. The Borderland of Culpability538

A. Insanity539

B. Entrapment541

C. Culpability and the Abandonment of Attempts544

7.3.3. Politics and Policies in Allocating the Burden of Persuasion545

7.3.4. The Burden of Persuasion as a Constitutional Issue549

7.4. The Structure of Wrongdoing552

7.4.1. Definition and Justification555

7.4.2. On Norms and Privileges562

7.4.3. On Distinguishing Between Norms and Exceptions566

7.5. Due Process and Fair Warning569

7.5.1. The Problem of Vagueness570

7.5.2. Legislative Control over the Refinement of the Criminal Law573

7.6. The Structure of Offenses: A Review575

7.6.1. The Definition of the Offense575

7.6.2. Wrongdoing and Justification576

7.6.3. Culpability, Wrongdoing and Excuses577

Chapter Eight: The Theory of Derivative Liability581

8.1. The Concepts of Direct and of Derivative Liability581

8.2. Derivative Liability for Omissions585

8.2.1. Causation and Derivative Liability588

8.2.2. An Alternative to "But For" Causation593

8.2.3. Verbs of Interference and Causation599

8.2.4. Liberty, Interference and Allocation602

8.2.5. The Quinlan Case606

8.3. Derivative Liability: The Criteria of Duty611

8.3.1. The Personal Relationship Between the Defendant and a Dependent Person611

8.3.2. A Community of Shared Risks614

8.3.3. Contract and Undertaking614

8.3.4. The Defendant's Creating the Danger618

8.3.5. Statutory Duties620

8.3.6. Duties To Control Third Persons622

8.3.7. The Scope of Duties To Avert Harm622

8.4. Derivative Liability for Omissions: Some Doubts625

8.4.1. Conceptual Problems625

8.4.2. Constitutional Arguments628

8.4.3. Accommodations631

8.4.4. Why Punish the Failure To Avert Harm?633

8.5. Perpetrators and Accessories: Derivative Liability for Human Conduct634

A. The Formal Basis of Liability635

B. Causation635

C. Intent635

8.5.1. Direct Liability for Perpetration637

8.5.2. Two Categories of Accessories640

8.5.3. A Special Category of Instigation644

8.5.4. Neighboring Concepts of Complicity645

A. Accessories After the Fact645

B. Conspiracy646

C. Vicarious Liability647

8.6. The Rationale for Differentiated Participation in Criminal Plans649

8.6.1. Punishing the Accessory for the Perpetrator's Wrong652

8.6.2. The Rationale for Categorically Mitigating the Accessory's Punishment654

8.7. Specific Problems of Demarcation657

8.7.1. Is the Person Who Culpably Executes the Deed Always a Perpetrator?657

8.7.2. When Is a Conspirator a Co-perpetrator?659

8.7.3. Accessories and Perpetrators-by-Means664

A. F's conduct is wrongful but excused.664

B. F's conduct is justified and therefore not wrongful.667

C. F's act is formally legal.670

8.7.4. The Special Status of Instigators671

8.8. Minimal Criteria for Accessorial Liability674

8.8.1. Parties to Conspiracies674

8.8.2. Minimal Facilitation677

Chapter Nine: The Theory of Mistake683

9.1. Introduction683

9.1.1. What Mistakes Are About684

A. Mistakes about elements of the definition684

B. Mistakes related to justificatory claims684

C. Mistakes about excusing conditions685

D. Mistakes in cases of negligent risk-taking685

E. Mistakes about elements extrinsic to culpability685

9.1.2. Outcomes in the Analysis of Mistakes687

A. Mistakes Negating Intent687

B. Mistakes Negating Culpability687

C. Irrelevant Mistakes690

9.2. Arguments Favoring the Exculpatory Effect of Mistakes691

9.2.1. Mistakes Negating the Required Intent691

9.2.2. The Borderland of Definition and Justification698

9.2.3. Requiring That Exculpatory Mistakes Be Reasonable707

9.3. Strategies for Disregarding Mistakes713

9.3.1. Mistakes Extrinsic to Wrongdoing and Culpability713

9.3.2. Arguments for Strict Liability: Special Governmental Purposes716

9.3.3. Arguments for Strict Liability: The Wrongdoer Runs the Risk723

9.3.4. Arguments for Strict Liability: Mistakes of Law730

9.4. Domesticating Mistakes of Law736

9.4.1. The German Experience737

9.4.2. The American Instrumentalist Rationale755

Chapter Ten: The Theory of Justification and Excuse759

10.1. Tensions in the Theory of Justification759

10.1.1. The Interactional Effects of Justificatory Claims759

10.1.2. The Problem of Putative Justification762

10.1.3. Is There a Single Theory of Justification?769

A. The Value of Autonomy770

B. Acting in the Name of the Government771

10.2. The Theory of Lesser Evils774

10.2.1. Lesser Evils in the German Tradition: The Statutory Background775

10.2.2. The Emergence of Extra-Statutory Necessity779

10.2.3. The Emergence of Necessity as a Justification in Anglo-American Law788

10.2.4. Limitations on the Privilege of Necessity792

10.3. The Theory of Excuses798

10.3.1. Excuses, Character and Desert799

10.3.2. Excuses and Voluntariness802

10.3.3. Compassion and Mercy in the Theory of Excuses807

10.3.4. Do Excuses Amend the Law?810

10.3.5. The Utilitarian Theory of Excuses813

10.4. A Comparative Survey of Excuses817

10.4.1. Necessity818

10.4.2. Duress829

10.4.3. The Synthesis of Duress and Necessity833

10.4.4. Insanity835

A. Is Insanity a Condition or an Excuse?836

B. Is Insanity a Scientific Issue?839

C. The Movement To Abolish the Insanity Defense843

10.4.5. Intoxication846

10.4.6. Inconsistent Duties852

10.5. The Theory of Necessary Defense855

10.5.1. Necessary Defense as an Excuse856

10.5.2. Necessary Defense as a Variation of Lesser Evils857

10.5.3. Necessary Defense and the Vindication of Autonomy860

10.5.4. Disputed Points in the Theory of Self-Defense864

A. The Duty To Retreat864

B. Rights of Third Parties868

C. The Culpability of the Aggressor869

D. The Problem of Proportionality870

Table of Cases877

Index885