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AUTHOR’S NOTE1

PART ONE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW5

INTRODUCTION： HANS KELSEN，JUDICIAL REVIEW，AND THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR5

CHAPTER 1 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND THE LEGISLATOR13

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS13

Ⅱ. CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONTROL OF CONVENTIONALITY20

Ⅲ. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORMS29

Ⅳ. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS31

CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER41

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RANK AND ENACTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES41

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND AMENDMENTS45

Ⅲ. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ADAPTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMATE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION50

1. Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights Guarantees51

2. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters65

Ⅳ. THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGITIMATE MUTATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION68

CHAPTER3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR ON EXISTING LEGISLATION73

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION73

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATOR BY ADDING NEW RULES （AND NEW MEANING） TO AN EXISTING LEGISLATIVE PROVISION79

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS BY INTERFERING WITH THE TEMPORAL EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION94

1. The Power of the Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Postponing the Effect of the Court’s Ruling95

2. The Power ofthe Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of 1ts Own Decisions103

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects Regarding Declarative Decisions103

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nune Constitutive Decisions108

3. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation114

Ⅳ. THE DEFORMATION OF THE INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ REFORMING OF STATUTES AND INTERPRETING THEM WITHOUT INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION115

CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR REGARDING LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS125

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS126

1. Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions126

2. The Protection of Fundamental Rights against Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection135

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF RELATIVE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS148

1. Constitutional Courts and Equality Rights： Deciding on the Unconstitutionality of Statutes without Declaring Their Nullity149

2. Constitutional Courts ’Issuing Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator153

3. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator160

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS PROVISIONAL LEGISLATORS165

CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW173

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING THEIR OWN JUDICIAL REVIEW POWERS173

1. The Judge-Made Law Regarding the Diffuse System of Judicial Review173

2. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights174

3. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation178

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING PROCEDURAL RULES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCESSES186

FINAL REMARKS189

PART TWO NATIONAL REPORTS193

ARGENTINA： Alejandra Rodriguez Galan and Alfredo Mauricio Vitolo，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators195

Ⅰ. REDUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE199

Ⅱ. RECOGNITION OF PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION200

Ⅲ. STANDING202

Ⅳ. ACCION DECLARATIVA DE CERTEZA （DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS） AS A DIRECT FORM OF EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW203

Ⅴ. SUA SPONTE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW204

Ⅵ. ERGA OMNES EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS205

Ⅶ. ACTIVIST JURISPRUDENCE205

1. “Educating” Congress206

2. Reconciling Internal Legislation with Human Rights Treaties by Means of Interpretation207

3. Amending Political Will and Rewriting Statutes208

Ⅷ. CONCLUSION211

AUSTRALIA： Cheryl Saunders，Interpretation and Review213

Ⅰ. FRAMEWORK213

1. Authority for Review213

2. Jurisdiction215

3. Concrete Review217

A. Advisory Opinions217

B. Declarations of Incompatibility219

4. Standing220

Ⅱ. APPROACH223

1. Phases224

A. 1903-1920224

B. 1920-1944225

C. 1944-1981226

D. 1981-1998228

E. 1998 to the Present230

2. Legalism and Realism231

A. Legalism231

B. Realism232

C. Realistic Legalism234

3. Interpretation and Change236

A. An Instrument of Government236

B. Relevance of the Framers238

Ⅲ. SOURCES240

1. Precedent240

2. Extrinsic Materials241

3. Foreign Law244

4. International Law246

BIBLIOGRAPHY249

AUSTRIA： Konrad Lachmayer，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators251

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION： CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRIA251

Ⅱ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN AUSTRIA252

1. Introduction252

2. Access to Constitutional Justice254

Ⅲ. JUDICIAL QUESTIONS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW256

1. Judicial Decisions on Judicial Review256

2. Effects of Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters257

Ⅳ. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT258

1. Developing the Contents of the Fundamental Principles of the Austrian Constitution258

2. Concrete Guidelines for the Legislator259

3. Creating Constitutional Systems261

4. Principle of Equality262

Ⅴ. CONCLUSION-OPENING UP CONSTITUTIONAL POTENTIALS AND VALUE-BASED JUDGMENTS263

BELGIUM： Patricia Popelier，The Belgian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator： In Search of a Balance Between Rights Protection and Respect for Acts of Parliament265

INTRODUCTION265

Ⅰ. THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS266

Ⅱ. LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT269

1. Some Examples271

2. Two Examples272

Ⅲ. LEGAL FRAMEWORK273

Ⅳ. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINDING THAT A LEGISLATIVE LACUNA IS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION275

CONCLUSIONS279

BRAZIL： Thomas Bustamante and Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante，Constitutional Courts as Negative Legislators： The Brazilian Case283

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS283

Ⅰ. THE DIFFUSE AND INCIDENTAL SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW285

Ⅱ. THE CONCENTRATED SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW289

1. Concentrated Constitutional Jurisdiction by Direct Actions289

A. The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality290

B. The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality292

C. The Direct Action against Unconstitutional Omissions293

D. The Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept296

2. Concentrated Constitutional Review by Concrete Claims298

A. Mandado de Seguranca （When Used to Contest an Act within the Legislative Procedure）299

B. The Writ of Injunction （Mandado de Injuncao）300

C. Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction302

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS303

1. Inter Partes and Erga Omnes Decisions303

2. Binding and Nonbinding Decisions305

3. The Scope ofthe Binding Effects of the Decisions of the Court306

4. Interpretative and Reductive Decisions by the Federal Supreme Court308

5. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality）310

6. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Diffuse Decisions on Constitutional Matters）311

7. Constitutional Mutations312

Ⅳ. CONCLUSION： THE IDEA OF THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR312

CANADA： Kent Roach，The Canadian Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators315

INTRODUCTION315

Ⅰ. CANADA’S SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW317

1. Federalism and the Court as Negative Legislator317

2. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms318

3. Negative and Positive Rights318

4. Charter Litigation319

5. Reference Cases319

6. Constitutional Remedies321

7. Positive Alternatives to Judicial Invalidation： Reading In or Judicial Amendments to Legislation322

8. Alternatives to Immediate Invalidation： Delayed Declarations of Invalidity and Reply Legislation324

Summary326

Ⅱ. CANADA’S EXPERIENCE WITH COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS328

1. Criminal Justice328

2. National Security329

3. Gay Rights331

4. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights333

5. Political Policy334

6. Minority-Language Policy335

7. Social and Economic Policy337

8. Labor Policy338

9. Health-Care Policy340

CONCLUSION342

COLOMBIA： German Alfonso Lopez Daza，Le juge constitutionnel colombien，legislateur-cadre positif： un gouvernement des juges345

INTRODUCTION345

Ⅰ. DYNAMISME DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE DANS SON ROLE DE PROTECTRICE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1991346

Ⅱ. JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE VERSUS POUVOIR EXECUTIF-POUVOIR LEGISLATIF348

Ⅲ. LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE-LEGISLATEUR CADRE POSITIF350

1. Sentences mampulatrices353

2. Sentence substitutive353

3. Sentences interpretatives ou conditionnees353

4. Sentence additive ou d’integration354

5. Sentence de recommandation du legislateur355

6. Les sentences-lois355

7. Les sentences a effet differe355

Ⅳ. CONSTRUCTION THEORIQUE DU CONCEPT“GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES”356

BIBLIOGRAPHIE359

COLOMBIA： Sandra Morelli，The Colombian Constitutional Court：From Institutional Leadership to Conceptual Audacity363

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS363

Ⅱ. DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA366

1. What Is the Unconstitutional State of Affairs？367

Ⅲ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF LAWS378

1. Warning378

2. The Control of the Constitutionality ofthe Acts Amending the Constitution383

A. The Constitutional Control Limited to the Vices of Procedure384

B. The Procedural Vices of the Law through Which a Constitutional Referendum Is Summoned385

a. The Power ofthe Congress of the Republic to Amend the Law Presented at the Request of a Popular Initiative386

b. The Violation of the Law of Benches （Bancadas）386

COSTA RICA： Ruben Hernaandez Valle，The Normative Resolutions of the Constitutional Court389

Ⅰ. TYPOLOGY OF FAVORABLE LEGAL REVIEW RESOLUTIONS389

1. Favorable Exhortative Resolutions389

2. Simple Unconstitutionality Resolutions391

A. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Partial Nature391

B. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Full Nature391

3. Interpretative Resolutions392

A. Unconstitutionality Due to Erroneous Interpretation or Misapplication of a Provision in a Specific Case392

B. Unconstitutionality a Result of the Effects of the Challenged Text or Provision394

4. Favorable Resolutions of Inapplicability395

5. Normative Resolutions395

A. Favorable Additive Resolutions396

B. Favorable Substitutive Resolutions397

Ⅱ. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE RESOLUTIONS401

1. The Justification of Normative Resolutions401

2. Criticism of Regulatory Resolutions402

Ⅲ. REGULATORY RESOLUTIONS AND THE LIMITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION403

BIBLIOGRAPHY406

CROATIA： Sanja Baric and Petar Bacic，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators407

Ⅰ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA： COMPOSITION，COMPETENCES，AND PROCEEDINGS407

1. Introduction407

2. Composition and Terms of Duty409

3. Competences of the Constitutional Court410

4. Proceedings of the Constitutional Court411

5. Abstract Review413

6. Concrete Review415

7. Effects of the Constitutional Court’s Decision415

8. Constitutional Complaint417

9. Other Competences420

A. Jurisdictional Disputes420

B. Impeachment of the President of the Republic420

C. Supervision of the Constitutionality of Programs and Activities of Political Parties420

D. Control of the Constitutionality and Legality of the Elections and the National Referendum and the Electoral Disputes421

E. Constitutional Court Procedures of Appeal421

F. Monitoring the Execution of Constitutionality and Legality，and Supervisory Control over Passing Regulations for Executing the Constitution，Laws，and Other Regulations422

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA423

1. Judicial Activism versus the Legislative Branch424

2. Methodological Activism of the Constitutional Court - The Interpretation and Power of the Legal Argument428

3. Procedural Activism - Precedence of Form over Content431

4. Substantial Activism - Support for Democracy and Constitutional Rights433

Ⅲ. CONCLUSIONS ON THE ACTIVISM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA440

CZECH REPUBLIC： Zdenek Kuhn，Czech Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator？445

Ⅰ. THE HISTORY AND THE POWERS OF THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT446

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST DECISIONS OF GENERAL COURTS448

Ⅲ. INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS IN ABSTRACT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW： “SOFT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW”454

Ⅳ. POSITIVE ASPECT OF NEGATIVE DECISIONS OF THE COURT458

Ⅴ. UNCONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM：PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES OR JUDICIAL SUBSTITUTION FOR THE LEGISLATOR？461

Ⅵ. THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACTING OPENLY AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR-CASES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW466

Ⅶ. COURT’S SELF-PERCEPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS468

FRANCE： Bertrand Mathieu，Le Conseil constitutionnel “legislateur positif. ” Ou la question des interventions du juge constitutionnel francais dans l’exercise de la function legislative471

Ⅰ. TITRE LIMINAIRE： ELEMENTS D’ANALYSES SUR LE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITE EN FRANCE472

Ⅱ. LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE LA FONCTION JURIDICTIONNELLE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL ET LA FONCTION LEGISLATIVE478

1. Les principes cadres478

2. De quelques modalites d’intervention mediates du Conseil constitutionnel479

- Les incidences sur la fabrication de la loi479

- Les incidences sur les revisions constitutionnelles479

- La question de la separabilite des dispositions inconstitutionnelles480

- Les consequences tirees de l’inconstitutionnalite relevee481

- L’outil de la proportionnalite483

Ⅲ. ANALYSE D’UNE MODALITE SPECIFIQUE D’INTERVENTION DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL： LES RESERVES D’INTERPRETATION484

1. Elements de definition et champ d’application484

2 Les destinataires des reserves d’interpretation488

3. La portee des reserves d’inierpretation： essai de typologie489

-L’exclusion d’une interpretation inconstitutionnelle： le postulat du respect de la Constitution par le legislateur489

-L’argument de la maladresse du 1egislateur490

-La tentation de la reecriture490

-La modification du champ d’application de la loi492

-La paralyse de 1’application de la loi493

4. Elements statistiques sommaires494

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION495

GERMANY： Ines Hartel，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators497

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL MEANS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW498

1. Civil Rights Injunctions498

2. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Statutes499

3. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Legislative Omissions500

4. Ex Officio Powers of Constitutional Judges and of the Constitutional Court or Tribunals501

5. Authority of the Supreme Court of Constitutional Courts to Remove and Take Over Cases from Lower Courts（Avocamiento）501

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW502

1. Constitutional Interpretation502

2. Declaration of the Unconstitutional Character of Statutes（Declaration of Incompatibility）503

3. Annulment （Complete or Partial） of Unconstitutional Statutes506

4. Influencing the Constitution509

5. Decisions Including Legislative Structures510

6. Additive Decisions Reforming Legislation513

7. Admonitory Decisions514

8. Judicial Replacement of the Legislator516

9. Judicial Replacement of the Government in Policy-Making Processes517

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS518

BELGIUM，FRANCE，GERMANY： Christian Behrendt，L’activite du juge constitutionnel comme legislateur-cadre positif521

INTRODUCTION521

Ⅰ. LA NOTION D’“INTERFERENCE”525

Ⅱ. LA CLASSIFICATION DES INTERFERENCES527

Ⅲ. L’IMPORTANCE QUANTITATIVE DES INTERFERENCES529

1. L’importance des lignes directrices530

2. L’importance des injonctions531

Ⅳ. LE RECOURS A LA TECHNIQUE DES INTERFERENCES：UNE TENTATIVE D’EVALUATION533

CONCLUSIONS537

GREECE： Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas and Stylianos-loannis G.Koutnatzis，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators539

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW540

1. Judicial Organization540

2. Control of Legislative and Executive Acts541

A. Origins and Development of Judicial Review throughout Greece’s Constitutional History541

B. Judicial Review under the Greek Constitution of 1975542

A. Constitutional Basis ofJudicial Review542

B. Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Claims543

C. Primary Features ofJudicial Review544

D. Means of Concentration of Review546

E. The Proposal to Establish a Constitutional Court549

F. Control of Conventionality552

G. Control of Executive Acts553

H. Control of Constitutional Amendments555

Ⅱ. THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW555

1. The Development of Constitutional Jurisprudence556

A. The Greek Courts’ Deferential Tradition556

B. Phases in the Judicial Implementation of the1975 Constitution558

2. Positive Legislation through Constitutional Adjudication563

A. Extension of Preferential Treatment in Equality Principle Cases563

B. The Council of State’s Environmental Jurisprudence567

A. Constitutional Entrenchment of the Current Status of Environmental Protection568

B. The Principle of Sustainable Development570

Ⅲ. FINAL REMARKS571

HUNGARY，Lorant Csink，Jozsef Petretei，and Peter Tilk，Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator575

Ⅰ. ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION575

Ⅱ. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT576

Ⅲ. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT578

Ⅳ. THE MANIFESTATION OF POSITIVE LEGISLATION579

1. Constitutional Requirement579

2. Mosaic Annulment581

3. Role of the Court in the Examination of Omissions582

4. Interpretation of the Constitution583

INDIA： Surya Deva，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Indian Experience587

INTRODUCTION587

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL REVIEW： CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION588

1. Judicial Review： The Provisions588

2. Judicial Review： The Interpretation591

Ⅱ. JUDICIARY BECOMING THE LEGISLATOR： SOME EXAMPLES594

1. Guidelines for Police Arrest and Detention： D K Basu v. State of West Bengal594

2. Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace： Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan596

3. Ragging Menace at Universities598

CONCLUSION600

ITALY： Giampaolo Parodi，The Italian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator603

BIBLIOGRAPHY620

MEXICO： Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor，The Mexican Supreme Court as Positive Legislator623

INTRODUCTION623

Ⅰ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT624

1. Brief Background624

2. Constitutional Evolution625

3. Powers625

A. Constitutional Control625

B. Other Jurisdiction and Powers627

Ⅱ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR627

1. Amparo Proceedings （Specific Effects）628

2. Abstract Unconstitutionality Cause ofAction against General Norms （Laws and International Treaties） and Constitutional Controversies （Erga Omnes Effect）632

3. Legislative Omissions639

CONCLUSIONS642

NETHERLANDS： Jerfi Uzman，Tom Barkhuysen，and Michiel L.van Em merik，The Dutch Supreme Court： A Reluctant Positive Legislator？645

INTRODUCTION645

Ⅰ. THE BAN ON JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW AND ITS SCOPE648

1. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution648

2. Summary651

Ⅱ. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW652

1. Introduction： Monism and Article 94 of the Constitution652

2. “Eligible to Bind All Persons ” and Judicial Lawmaking653

3. The Increasing Role of the European Convention in National Case Law656

4. Concluding Remarks660

Ⅲ. THE LAWMAKING ROLE OF THE COURTS661

1. Introduction661

2. Defining the Process of Lawmaking662

3. The Case Law of the Supreme Court Concerning Its Lawmaking Role663

A. The Dual Custody Case： Distinguishing Positive from Negative Lawmaking664

B. The Dutch Citizenship Case： Avoiding Policy Decisions665

C. The Spring Decisions： Judicial Activism or Prudent Lawmaking？667

D. After the High-Water Mark： A Slow Retreat to Judicial Restraint667

E. Toward a New Model： The 1999 Labour Expenses Deduction Judgment669

F. The Exception to the Rule： European Union Law673

4. Reactions of “La Doctrine ” after 1999675

Ⅳ. MEANS AND EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW678

1. Introduction678

2. Procedures Available to Enforce Fundamental Rights Law678

3. Remedies for Fundamental Rights Violations679

4. Effects of Judgments681

5. Mitigating the Temporal Effects of Judgments683

6. Judicial Reforms685

SUMMARY686

BIBLIOGRAPHY688

NORWAY： Eivind Smith，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators693

Ⅰ. ON THE ORIGINS OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW693

Ⅱ. ON THE CHARACTER OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW695

Ⅲ. THE SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？697

POLAND： Marek Safjan，The Constitutional Courts as a Positive Legislator701

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY REMARKS701

Ⅱ. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？703

Ⅲ. INDIRECT，POSITIVE IMPACT- EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE LEGISLATION703

Ⅳ. DIRECT FORMS OF IMPACT EXERTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS VERSUS NORMATIVE ACTS708

1. Interpretation of the Constitution708

2. Interpretation of Laws： Interpretative Rulings714

3. Signalization717

CONCLUSIONS718

PORTUGAL： Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro and Esperanca Mealha，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators721

Ⅰ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN PORTUGAL721

1. The Preemptive Control722

2. The Abstract Review and the Concrete Review of Legislation723

3. The Enforceability and Implementation of Decisions of the Constitutional Court723

Ⅱ. POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT724

1. Portuguese Constitutional Court as a Negative Legislator724

2. Powers of the Court and Effects of Constitutional Review Decisions725

3. Interpretation of Statute in Harmony with the Constitution728

4. Manipulative and Additive Decisions729

5. The Impact of Constitutional Case Law730

SERBIA： Bosko Tripkovic，A Constitutional Court in Transition：Making Sense of Constitutional Adjudication in Postauthoritarian Serbia735

INTRODUCTION735

Ⅰ. NORMATIVE GOALS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW736

Ⅱ. PERFORMANCE OF THE SERBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT741

1. General Features of the System ofJudicial Review741

2. Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Process747

A. Representation747

B. Deliberation753

3. Constitutional Court and Liberal Values757

A. Direct Protection of Liberal Values758

B. Indirect Protection of Liberal Values762

CONCLUSION764

SLOVAK REPUBLIC： Jan Svak and Lucia Berdisova，Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic as Positive Legislator via Application and Interpretation of the Constitution767

Ⅰ. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION769

Ⅱ. ABSTRACT CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY771

1. Effect of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding the Unconformity Between Legal Regulations773

Ⅲ. CONCRETE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY775

SWITZERLAND： Tobias Jaag，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators783

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION783

1. Courts as Legislators in General783

2. The Federal Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court784

A Judicial Review in General784

B. Limitations on Judicial Review785

3. The Federal Supreme Court as Legislator786

A. Negative Legislation786

B. Positive Legislation788

4. Federal and Cantonal Law788

Ⅱ. REFUSAL OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT TO ACT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR789

1. Principle789

2. Examples789

Ⅲ. THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR791

1. In General791

2. Fundamental Rights791

A. New Fundamental Rights791

B. Interpretation and Substantiation of Fundamental Rights793

3. Political Rights793

4. Procedural Guarantees795

5. Federal Conflicts796

6. Compensation for Infringement of Property Rights797

7. Further Examples798

CONCLUSIONS798

BIBLIOGRAPHY800

ABBREVIATIONS802

UNITED KINGDOM： John Bell，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators803

INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY803

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL （JUDICIAL） REVIEW，CONCENTRATED OR DISTRIBUTED806

Ⅱ. SPECIFIC ISSUES807

1. Constitutional Review Procedures807

2. Judicial Decisions808

A. Human Rights and Judicial Activism809

B. Judicial Substitution811

3. Effect of Decisions813

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA： Laurence Claus and Richard S.Kay，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in the United States815

Ⅰ. LEGISLATORS AND POSITIVE LEGISLATORS815

Ⅱ. HOW AMERICAN COURTS LEGISLATE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION820

Ⅲ. ENFORCING JUDICIAL LEGISLATION829

VENEZUELA： Daniela Urosa Maggi，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Venezuelan Experience843

Ⅰ. THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER846

Ⅱ. CASES WHERE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER HAS EXTENDED ITS OWN COMPETENCIES THROUGH THE PRACTICING OF THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION847

1. Competencies in Constitutional Amparo Matters848

A. Modification of the Competencies to Hear the Amparo Claims849

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Constitutional Amparo Claim849

2. Competencies in the Special Recourse to Review Decisions850

3. Competencies to Hear the Interpretation of the Constitution Recourse852

4. Competencies in Matters of Concentrated Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Other Acts Having Rank of Law855

A. Jurisprudential Inclusion of the Competency of Incidental Control over Statutes855

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Nullity Cases857

5. Competencies in Matters of Control over Unconstitutionality for Omission858

6. Competency in Matters of Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests859

A. Creation of a Claim for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests859

B. Procedure to Be Followed and Legitimacy in Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests860

7. Competencies in Mattes of Habeas Data860

Ⅲ. CASES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION： THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER AS POSITIVE CONSTITUENT862

1. Decisions No. 6 ofJanuary 27，2000 （case Milagros Gomez et al） and No. 180 of March 28，2000 （case Allan Brewer-Cariaset al）： Legitimization of the Constitutional Transition Regime Approved by the National Constituent Assembly on December 1999 and Legitimization of the Acts Performed by Such Assembly in the Execution of Such Transition RegimE.863

2. Decision No. 34 of January 26，2004 （case Vestalia Araujo）：Interpretation of Article 203 of the Constitution864

3. Decision No. 565 ofApril 15，2008 （case Attorney General of the Republic）： Interpretation ofArticle 164.10，of the 1999 Constitution865

Ⅳ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN WHICH IT ACTED AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR FOR ADDING TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES THAT DID NOT EXIST BEFORE867

1. Decision No. 1013 ofJune 12，2001 （case Elias Santana）：Interpretation and Limitation of Rights Related to Freedom of Expression and Right to Rebuttal867

2. Decision No. 978 ofApril 30，2003 （case Bolivar Banco）：Resolution of the Method and Opportunity for Exercising the State Tax Authority on Tax Stamp Matters Pending the Issuing of the Relevant National Legislation868

3. Decision No. 511 ofApril5，2004 （case Maira Rincon Lugo）：Decision on the Taking over Proceeding of Cases from Lower Courts （Avocamiento），Having Binding Nature for All Other Courts of the Supreme Tribunal ofJustice869

4. Decision No. 1682 ofJuly 15，2005 （case Carmela Manpieri）：Interpretation of Article 77 of the Constitution - Comparison between Men and Women De Facto and Men and Women Marriage - and the Praetorian Development ofIts Legal Regime870

5. Decision No. 1456 ofJuly 27，2006 （case Yamilex Nunez de Godoy） and the Praetorian Development of the Legal Regime of Assisted Reproduction871

Ⅴ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT THAT ACTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR TO MODIFY PREEXISTING LAWS872

1. Decisions That Modify Legal Rules through SubstitutiveDecisions on No Prior Declaration of Annulment of the Rule872

A. Decision No. 2855 of November 20，2002 （case FEDENAGA）： Constitutionality of Articles 40 and 43 of the Decree with Force of Law on Rural Lands and Agrarian Development873

B. Decision No. 2560 of August 5，2005 （case Romulo Pacheco）： Modification of Article 172 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure874

C. Decision No. 301 of February 27，2007 （case Adriana Vigilanza）： Modification of the Sense and Scope of Article 31 of the Income Tax Law875

2. Decisions of the Constitutional Chamber That Annulled and Established the New Wording of Legal Provisions877

A. Decision no. 80 of February 1，2001 （Case of Procedural Terms）： Modification of Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code Regarding the Calculation of Procedural Terms877

B. Decision No. 1264 of June 11，2002 （case Jesus Rendon）：Partial Annulment of Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Code That Governs Judicial Holidays878

C. Decision No. 2241 of September 24，2002 （case Andres Velazquez）： Partial Annulment of Article 80 of the Organic Law on the Financial Administration of the Public Sector879

D. Decision No. 3241 of December 12，2002 （case COVEIN）： Partial Annulment of Article 1 of the Ordinance on the Industry and Commerce License Tax of the Bolivar Municipality of the Anzoategui State880

E. Decision No. 865 of April 22，2003 （case Ernesto Jose Rodriguez Casares）： Annulment of Article 48 of the Ordinance on Urban and Rural Common and Personal Lands for the Bolivar District of the Zulia State881

F. Decision No. 1104 of May 23，2006 （case Carlos Brender）： Partial Annulment of Article 90 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General of the Republic882

G. Decision No. 163 of February 28，2008 （case Ciro Ramon Aratjo）： Partial Annulment of the Organic Law of Public Detcnse883

a. Partial Annulment and Modification of the Text of Article 3 of the Organic Law of Public Defense883

b Partial Annulment and Modification of Articles 11，12，and 13 of the Organic Law of Public Defense883

c. Partial Annulment and Modification of Article 15 of the Organic Law of Public Defense884

Ⅵ BRIEF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXERCISE OF THE NORMATIVE POWERS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME CHAMBER OF JUSTICE885

PART THREE SYNTHESIS REPORT： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW889

PRELIMINARY REMARKS889

1. The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution889

2. New Role of Constitutional Courts and the Question of Acting as Positive Legislators891

FIRST TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER893

1. Constitutional Courts Resolving Constitutional Federal Disputes and Enacting Constitutional Rules893

2. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Provisions894

3. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Reforms and Amendments894

4. The Role of Constitutional Courts Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights896

5. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters897

SECOND TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH EXISTING LEGISLATION899

1. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interpreting Statutes in Harmony with the Constitution899

2. Constitutional Courts Complementing the Legislator byAdding New Rules （and a New Meaning） to the Existing Legislative Provision900

3. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interfering with the Temporal Effects of Legislation902

A. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effect：Postponing the Etfect of the Courts’ Ruling903

B. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects：The Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of Their Own Decisions904

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects of Declarative Decisions905

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nunc Constitutive Decisions906

4. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation907

THIRD TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION OR WITH LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS907

1. Constitutional Courts Filling In Absolute Legislative Omissions907

A. The Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions908

B. The Protection of Fundamental Rights from Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection909

2. Constitutional Courts Filling In the Gap of Relative Legislative Omissions912

A. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator913

B. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator914

3. Constitutional Courts as Provisional Legislators915

FOURTH TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW917

1. Constitutional Courts’ Creating of Their Own Judicial Review Powers917

A. The Judge-Made Law on the Diffuse System of Judicial Review917

B. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights918

2. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation919

3. Constitutional Courts ’Creation of Procedural Rules on Judicial Review920

FINAL REMARKS921

APPENDIX925

INDEX929